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SAFAIE v. INS
25 E3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994)
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
I. FACTS
Azar Safaie was authorized to remain in the
United States as a nonimmigrant visitor from De-
cember 1984 untilApril 1985.' She remained in this
country after her visitation period had expired, and
in October 1987, the INS ordered her to show cause
why the agency should not deport her. She conceded
that she was deportable but requested asylum, claim-
ing that the Iranian government might imprison or
kill her for her opposition to the Khomeini regime
and its treatment of women.
2
At a hearing before an immigration judge,
Safaie's testimony centered on her treatment in Iran.
First, she described the manner in which the gov-
ernment treated her as a result of herWestern dress,
makeup, and perfume. For instance, an Iranian offi-
cial had employed Safaie as a secretary in 1981, but
he discharged her because she refused to wear tra-
ditional Iranian clothing.3 Additionally, while she was
a student at the University of Teheran, Revolution-
ary Guard members threatened her due to her West-
ern clothing and smoking.4 She began wearing the
Islamic dress when it became mandatory.by law in
1982. Second, Safaie described the manner in which
she was treated because of her political opposition
to the "lack of freedom" in Iran.5 She was a member
of a pro-Shah 6 party And participated in several dem-
onstrations against the Khomeini regime. She had
also allowed a group of people to meet at her house
in oider to plan a coup d'etat. The government later
discovered the coup, and all the group members ei-
ther were killed or fled the country. As a result,
Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 638 (8th Cir. 1994).
2Safaie, 25 F.3d at 638. Islam preaches that the infe-
rior station of women is fundamental to the survival of
the state. Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the
Khomeini regime has instituted Islamic tenets which have
been recognized as the most conspicuous abuses of women
in modem times. For a more detailed discussion of the
abuses on women in the Khomeini regime, see David L.
Neal, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based
Persecution As Grounds for Asylum, 20 Colum. Hum.
Rights. L. Rev. 203, 207-22 (1988).
325 F.3d at 638. Khomeini requires women to cover
everything except their faces and hands with a wrap called
a Hejab. The Hejab physically and psychologically op-
presses women because unveiled women are ostracized
and labeled as prostitutes. The minimal punishment for
Hezbollah members followed her everywhere she
went. Third, Safaie testified about her treatment at
the University ofTeheran. 7 In 1982, officials detained
thousands of demonstrating students, including
Safaie.A university official interrogated her for eight
hours, threatened to kill her, and forced her to fill
out a questionnaire and to undergo twenty separate
interviews concerning her political beliefs. Although
the university readmitted Safaie one month after the
incident, she was expelled in 1984 because she re-
fused to accept Islamic rules and failed to attend
the funeral of the university official who had inter-
rogated her two years earlier. In addition, the immi-
gration judge heard that the Iranian authorities had
taken her passport in 1983, but that a friend of
Safaie's had arranged to have it returned. Safaie also
managed to obtain a visa to visit the United States
in 1984.8
Denying Safaie's request for asylum, the immi-
gration judge found that her evidence "consisted
primarily of blanket assertions" that she might be
persecuted for her past criticisms of the Khomeini
regime were she returned to Iran. Safaie appealed
to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board
affirmed and adopted the immigration judge's deci-
sion. Safaie petitioned the Eighth Circuit to review
the final INS decision denying her request.
II. HOLDING
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Board's deci-
sion denying Safaie's asylum request because Safaie
failed to meet the statutory requirements for asy-
refusing to wear a veil consists of 74 lashes without any
formal review of the crime. The maximum punishment is
death. See Neal, supra note 2, at 217-21.
4 Id. The government approves of the Hezballahi prac-
tice of upholding public morality by harassing, detaining,
attacking, knifing, and maiming women who refuse to
wear Hejab. See Neal, supra note 2, at 220.
s Id. at 639.
6 d. A shah ruled Iran's constitutional monarchy be-
tween 1906 and 1979. At that time, Islamic clergymen
led a popular uprising which resulted in the establish-
ment of a republic. See Iran, Microsoft Encarta (1995)
(computer software).
7 Id. at 638-39.
81d. at 639.
lum. 9 Under the Refugee Act of 1990, the United
States Attorney General may grant asylum'0 to an
applicant who "is persecuted or... has a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion."" The Eighth Circuit
ruled that Safaie did not fit the statutory definition
because Iranian women could not constitute a par-
ticular social group by virtue of gender alone? Al-
though the Eighth Circuit concluded that women
who oppose dress and behavioral customs so pro-
foundly that they would choose to suffer the severe
consequences of non-compliance could constitute a
particular social group within the meaning of the
statute, it found that Safaie was not a member of
such a group. 3 Furthermore, the court found that
Safaie lacked a well-founded fear of persecution
based on her articulated political beliefs.1
4
III. ANALYSIS
A. EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION
In her request for asylum, Safaie first contended
that she had a "well-founded fear of persecution on
account of ... [her] membership in a particular
social group .... ,,15 To qualify for asylum on these
grounds, she was required to "(1) identify a group
that constitutes a 'particular social group' .. ., (2)
establish that... she is a member of that group, and
(3) show that ... she would be persecuted or has a
well-founded fear of persecution based on that mem-
bership."' 6A well-founded fear of persecution is one
that is genuine and that a reasonable person in the
same circumstances would have if returned to her
native land.1
7
Safaie asserted that all Iranian women, by vir-
tue of the harsh restrictions which the Iranian gov-
ernment placed on them, constitute a particular so-
9Id. at 639-41.
"0 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (1994).
"8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (A) (1994) defines the statu-
tory grounds for asylum:
The term "refugee" means ... any person who is
outside any country of such persons's national-
ity or, in the case of a person having no national-
ity, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or un-
willing to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion ....
cial group.I The Eighth Circuit refused to accept this
contention, stating that no reasonable fact finder could
conclude that "all Iranian women had a well-founded
fear of persecution based solely on their gender."9
Safaie further asserted that those women who
advocate women's rights or oppose Iranian behav-
ioral or dress customs constitute a "particular social
group," of which she was a member. The Eighth
Circuit stated that a group of women such as Safaie
could constitute a particular social group only if their
opposition met the standard set forth in Fatin v.
INS.2°The Third Circuit in Fatin limited such a group
to those women who find Iranian gender-specific
laws "so abhorrent that they refuse to conform-
even though ... the routine penalty for noncompli-
ance is 74 lashes, a year's imprisonment, and in ...
many brutal rapes and death .... ," The Eighth
Circuit found that Safaie failed to meet this stan-
dard. It interpreted Safaie's wearing of the manda-
tory garb as her choice to comply with the dress
customs rather than suffer the harsh consequences
of noncompliance. The court did not reach the is-
sue of whether she had a well-founded fear of per-
secution because it inferred from her testimony that
she would forego her opposition to the Khomeini
regime in favor of compliance with the dress and
behavioral customs in order to avoid punishment.
Second, Safaie requested asylum based on her "well-
founded fear of persecution on account of... [her]
political opinion." To qualify for asylum on these
grounds, she had to" (1) specify the political opin-
ion on which ... she relie[d], (2) show that. . . she
[held] that opinion, and (3) show that.., she would
be persecuted or ha[d] a well-founded fear of per-
secution based on that opinion.122 Her claim hinged
on her opposition to the Iranian Islamic government
and the harsh restrictions which the government
placed on women.?3 In denying her request, the
Eighth Circuit did not deny that her opposition was
USafaie, 25 F.3d at 640.
1325 F.3d at 640.
14Id. at 640-41.
'Id. at 640 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(1994)).
16Id. (quoting Fatin v. INS, 12 E3d 1233, 1240 (3d
Cir. 1993)).
7Id. at 639 (citing Wojcik v. INS, 951 F.2d 172, 173
(8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)).
MM1d. at 640.
'9 d. (all emphasis added).
20 d. (citing Fatin, 12 .3d at 1233).
21 F atin, 12 F.3d at 1241 (quoting Petitioner's Br. at
12-14) (internal citations omitted).
2212 F.3d at 1242.
'3 Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640-41.
political; rather, it concluded that she lacked a well-
founded fear of persecution based on her political
opinion.
24
In order to establish a well-founded fear of per-
secution, Safaie had to establish that she had both a
subjective and an objective fear of persecution. 5 The
Eighth Circuit found that she met the subjective
component because the record demonstrated her
genuine fear that the government would hurt her.
26
However, the court concluded that she failed to meet
the objective component because no reasonable
person in Safaie's circumstances would fear perse-
cution if returned to Iran. It based its conclusion in
part on the evidence that she remained in Iran physi-
cally unharmed after expulsion from the university
and that neither she nor her family were harmed
after the coup attempt. Additionally, the court high-
lighted the Iranian government's willingness to is-
sue a visa to Safaie even after her expulsion and
participation in the coup attempt. Even though she
reasonably feared imprisonment upon her return to
Iran, the court found that brief confinement for
opposition to a totalitarian regime was not persecu-
tion.27
The Eighth Circuit also concluded that Safaie
faced the same risk of persecution as all other Ira-
nian women because she failed to show that the
persecution was directed specifically at her for her
political opinion.28 Even if she had presented facts
that demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion, the court could not have granted her asylum
request. Additionally, she had to show that the per-
secution was grounded in more than "general condi-
2425 F3d at 640-41.While the Fatin court acknowl-
edged that "feminism qualified as a political opinion" pro-
tected under the statute, the court did not grant asylum
to Fatin because she failed to demonstrate that Iranian
feminists were subject to treatment "extreme" enough to
constitute persecution. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1242-43.
Id. at 640.
16Id. At the hearing, a psychologist from the Center
for Treatment of Torture Victims testified that she had
treated Safaie for post-traumatic stress disorder in June
1987. Safaie had experienced nightmares, anxiety, panic
attacks, and mood swings. While the psychologist testi-
fied that these symptoms were consistent with physical
torture, the psychologist could not confirm that Iranian
government's actions caused Safaie's symptoms. Id. at 639.
271d. at 640 (citing Kapcia v. INS, 944 F2d 702, 708
(10th Cir. 1991)).
281d. In order to meet the statutory definition of per-
secution, the applicant must show that the persecutory
policies were enforced selectively against her. See Anne
M. Gomez, The New INS Guidelines on Gender Persecu-
tions of upheaval and unrest"zg; for "random violence
[could] not substantiate a claim of persecution un-
der immigration laws."
30
B. EVALUATION OF THE
COURT'S OPINION
By ruling that women who advocate feminism
are not a "particular social group" unless they choose
to accept severe physical punishment over compli-
ance with behavioral and dress customs, the Eighth
Circuit established a high standard for female asy-
lum applicants to meet. To require a person to choose
between sacrificing bodily integrity and demonstrat-
ing a commitment to her political beliefs is essen-
tially a false choice. When the Eighth Circuit exam-
ined whether Safaie had a reasonable "well-founded
fear," the court first considered that the Iranian gov-
ernment had not physically harmed her and that it
issued a visa to her after expulsion from the univer-
sity and the coup attempt. It also considered that
the Iranian government had readmitted her to the
university after her expulsion. Each of these facts
was unknown to Safaie at the time of their occur-
rence. Hence, the court used its hindsight to evalu-
ate the totality of her circumstances. The court dis-
regarded the fact that a reasonable person does not
have the benefit of time passing to decide whether
she should have actual fear of persecution. In doing
so, the Eighth Circuit established a potentially in-
surmountable standard for female applicants to
meet.
tion: Their Effect on Asylum in the United States for Women
Fleeing the Forced Sterilization and Abortion Policies of the
People's Republic of China, 21 N.CJ. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.
621, 634-35 (1996). The courts continually deny asylum
to Chinese citizens opposing the government's "one
couple, one-child" policy because the applicants cannot
prove that they are more likely than any other citizen to
suffer the consequences of not obeying the policy. Popu-
lation control is the sole purpose of the "one couple, one
child" policy, and the government punishes all who dis-
obey. Therefore, the Chinese government does not selec-
tively enforce the policies against only those persons who
disagree with the policy. See Gomez, supra, at 634-35.
(citing Matter of Chang, No. A-27202715, 1989 BIA
LEXIS 13; Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 858 F Supp. 569
(E.D.Va. (1994), aff'd 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995)).
29 Huaman-Cornelio v. Board of Immigration Appeals,
979 F.2d 995, 1000 (4th Cir. 1992).
30 Rodriguez-Rivera v. United States Dep't of Imnigra.
tion &Naturalization, 848 F.2d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam).
The Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits have
established such high standards for gender-based
asylum claims for two reasons. First, allowing gen-
der alone to define a "particular social group" would
mean that a number of countries' entire female
populations would become eligible for asylum.
3'
However, the fear of the flood of asylum claimants
is not itself well-founded. On March 9, 1993, the
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board issued its
Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing
Gender Related Persecution. These were the first na-
tional guidelines to recognize women who flee per-
secution based on their gender as refugees. 32 Under
these guidelines, Canada began granting asylum to
women subjected to reproductive persecution. 3 As
of yet, the floodgates have not opened in Canada.34
Notably, the flow of immigrants into the United
States has not increased since the beginning of this
century.35 Female applicants make up only thirty
percent of the 145,000 asylum applicants. 36An even
smaller number of women are able to satisfy the
procedural and legal requirements to obtain asy-
lum-especially the "well-founded fear" require-
ment.37 Therefore, the courts' fear of floodgates may
be misplaced.
Second, courts are probably reluctant to con-
demn the policy decisions that other governments
make regarding important social issues. For example,
while courts recognize that individuals may disagree
with Chinese reproductive policies supporting
forced abortion or sterilization, they also acknowl-
edge that China faces a population crisis. 38 Courts
prefer not to second-guess the means by which the
Chinese government has decided to address this di-
lemma even when those means are abhorrent to
American culture.
3 See Gomez, supra note 28, at 632, 645.
32 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Consider-
ationsforAsylum OfficersAdjudicatingAsylum Claims from
Women, at 3 (May 26, 1995) (citing Immigration and
Refugee Board, Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson Pur-
suant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act: Women Refu-
gee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (Ottawa,
Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board, 9 March 1993)
[hereinafter INS Guidelines].
33 Gomez, supra note 28, at 645.
34 1d.
3s Layli Miller Bashir, Female Genital Mutilation in the
United States: An Examination of Criminal and Asylum
C. NEW INS GUIDELINES FOR
ADJUDICATING ASYLUM CLAIMS
BASED ON GENDER PERSECUTION
On May 26, 1995, the INS Office of Interna-
tional Affairs issued a memo entitled Considerations
forAsylum OfficersAdjudicatingAsylum Claims from
Women. 39 This memo was "to provide the INS Asy-
lum Officer Corps... with guidance and background
on adjudicating cases of women based wholly or in
part on their gender."40 The new guidelines do not
mandate asylum officers to make any changes to
current asylum law. They simply synthesize current
law on gender-based persecution claims and describe
the new interview procedures which asylum offic-
ers are encouraged to follow when evaluating gen-
der-based claims.
41
1. ANALYSIS FOR ASYLUM
OFFICERS' ADJUDICATION
OF GENDER-BASED CLAIMS
The guidelines outline the various factors which
asylum officers must consider in order for courts to
uphold their decision to grant or withhold asylum
status. Although they do not distinguish between
male and female applicants with respect to the legal
analysis conducted on their claims, they warn asy-
lum officers that gender-based claims, particularly
those which females make, may be more complex
to adjudicate than other claims. The guidelines in-
struct asylum officers to be attentive to three issues
which might arise in gender-related claims: (1)
whether the gender-based harm is serious enough
to constitute persecution; (2) whether the gender-
based persecution has a statutory foundation; and
(3) whether gender precludes the applicant from
seeking her own government's protection or from
relocating within her country.
42
Law, 4 Am. U.J. Gender & L. 415, 452 (1996). In 1995,
about 900,000 people immigrated into the United States.
Id. at 452.
36 Bashir, supra note 35, at 452.37
1 d.
3 Gomez, supra note 28, at 634-35 (discussing the
selective enforcement requirement with respect to the
Chinese "one couple, one child" policy).
319INS Guidelines.4QId. at 1.
4Id. at 4-18.
421d. at 8-18.
Harms that are serious enough to constitute
persecution include "threats to life, confinement,
torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they
constitute a threat to life or freedom."4" If many
people within a country suffer from the same harms,
the applicant's claims may not rise to the level of
persecution.44 Discriminatory practices and experi-
ences alone will not constitute persecution; how-
ever, if they accumulate over time and increase in
intensity, they might rise to the requisite level.
45
The guidelines list harms that may constitute
persecution and are typically unique to female gen-
der-based asylum claims: sexual abuse, rape, infan-
ticide, genital mutilation, forced marriage, slavery,
domestic violence, and forced abortion.46 Neverthe-.
less, the guidelines do not require asylum officers to
conclude that a claim of sexual violence amounts to
persecution.47 Even when the applicant asserts that
she has been raped, she must still meet the statu-
tory requirements by proving that (1) she has a well-
founded fear of persecution and (2) the persecution
is based on race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.
48
The guidelines also suggest that forced behavior
which is "profoundly abhorrent" to the applicant's
fundamental beliefs may constitute persecution.
49
However, they recognize the high standard which
the Fatin court set 0 and emphasize that our society's
views of what is unfair, unjust, unlawful, or uncon-
stitutional should not define persecution.-'
The INS guidelines permit officers to grant asy-
lum only for persecution based on those grounds
included in the Refugee Act: "race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion."52 They recognize that gender-
based claims will typically arise under two of these
grounds: persecution based on political opinion and
persecution based on membership in a particular
social group.s3 The guidelines seem to recognize the
unpredictibility of determining the factual circum-
stances which might constitute persecution based
431d. at 8-9 (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec.
211, 222 (BIA 1985), overruled on other grounds by Mat-
terofMogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987)).
44 Id. at 9 (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at
222; Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1969)).
45 Id. (citing Basic Law ManuaLAsylum at 22).
4 6
1d.
4 7
1d.
48d. at 8;see 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (1994).
4 1Id. at 9-10.
Id. (citing Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1233).
51Id. at 10.
52
/d.
on political opinion. Citing Fatin, they note that
feminism may equal a political opinion. While ac-
knowledging that the Third Circuit viewed Fatin as
a feminist, the guidelines emphasize that she did
not meet the asylum standard.r4 By specifying that
Fatin did not meet this standard, the guidelines im-
ply that the Fatin court did not construct a standard
which asylum officers could easily apply.
The guidelines also indicate that the INS is un-
certain about which factual circumstances might
comprise persecution based on membership in a
particular social group. They require persons in a
"particular social group" to "share a common, im-
mutable characteristic" which the members of the
group either cannot change or should not change
"because it is fundamental to their individual iden-
tities,"s and they recognize that gender may be one
such characteristic.16 However, they note that the
Second Circuit has ruled that gender alone will not
endow applicants with membership to a particular
social group. 7 Although the Third and Eighth Cir-
cuits have concluded that gender alone may consti-
tute a particular social group, the guidelines empha-
size that neither court has ever found an individual
who has met that definition.58
In addition, the guidelines recognize that, in
theory, applicants may use a combination of gender
and other factors to demonstrate their membership
in a particular social group. However, no court ac-
cepting that gender may combine with other fac-
tors to constitute membership in a particular social
group has found that an applicant's experience
amounted to persecution under this criteria. 9 The
guidelines further emphasize that, if an applicant
attributes her persecution to her gender plus other
factors, the other factors must be cognizable to the
group responsible for the persecution. 60 Under this
rationale, a persecutor who lacks knowledge of those
factors cannot single out and harm an individual on
the basis of those factors. This could be the under-
lying reason for the Fatin and Safaie courts to re-
531Id. at 10-16.
s4 Id. at 11.
"Id. at 12 (citing Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 233).
16Id. (citing Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 233).571d. at 13 (citing Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664
(2d Cir. 1991).
S1Id. (citing Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240); see also INS
Guidelines, supra note 32, at 13 n.13 (citing Safaie, 25
F.3d at 640).
-'Id. (citing Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241; Safaie, 25 F.3d at
640).
I" Id. at 15 (citing UNHCR Programme, No. 39(k)
(36th Session 1985)).
quire women to suffer the consequences of femi-
nist beliefs rather than conform to the Khomeini
lifestyle. A persecutor can single out a female who
opposes dress and behavioral customs only when she
does not conform with the customs.
After considering whether the.harm constitutes
persecution and whether the persecutor inflicted the
harm on one of the five statutory grounds, the asy-
lum adjudicator must determine whether the ap-
plicant may seek protection elsewhere in her coun-
try.6' The guidelines encourage officers to consider
several factors especially. First, applicants subject to
persecution by the government or someone whom
the government cannot control might not be able
to avoid harm by relocating elsewhere in the coun-
try.62 Second, the agency does not have to grant asy-
lum to applicants solely on the ground that a public
official was responsible for the persecution.63 For
example, in Matter of Pierre,4 the applicant's claim
was denied even though the Haitian government
would not restrain her husband from abusing her
due to his position as a legislator.65 Third, the law of
the applicant's country may preclude females from
seeking residency elsewhere in the country.66
2. INTERVIEW PROCESS
One of the primary goals of the new INS guide-
lines is to implement application procedures which
make the asylum process more amicable to women
with gender-based persecution claims.67 The guide-
lines encourage, but do not require, female asylum
officers to conduct interviews of women asserting
gender-based daims a They encourage officers to use
female interpreters and to conduct interviews out-
side the hearing of other family members in order
to encourage more candid responses.69 The guide-
lines highlight that female applicants might have
particular difficulties in discussing sexual violence
and, hence, might exhibit a demeanor that makes
them appear less credible.70 In addition, the guide-
lines require officers to review the merits of a wife's
claim when filed as a derivative claim of her
husband's, even though his fails to meet asylum stan-
dards.
7'
61Id. at 16.
2Id. at 18.
0 Id. at 16-17.
' Matter of Pierre, 15 I&N Dec. 461 (BIA (1975).
61INS Guidelines at 16-17 (citing Matter of Pierre, 15
I&N Dec. 461 (BIA (1975)).
66Id. at 18.
IV. CONCLUSION
The new INS guidelines explain when adjudi-
cators should grant asylum for claims grounded on
gender-based persecution. They highlight those
cases, including Fatin and Safaie, which conclude
that a female applicant had a cognizable claim but
that the circumstances surrounding her claim fell
short of persecution. The guidelines stress that ad-
judicators must "carefully ascertain all the facts sur-
rounding an allegation of persecution ,,,72 thus
highlighting the same conclusion to which Safaie
leads-that practitioners must meticulously estab-
lish and argue that the factual bases of the applicant's
case rise to persecution.
Without more evidence indicating Safaie's
choice to suffer the consequences of noncompliance,
the guidelines probably would not have changed the
outcome of Safaie had they been in effect when
Safaie applied for asylum. The guidelines present
the opportunity for applicants to show that a viola-
tion of fundamental beliefs amounts to persecution,
but the record in Safaie failed to establish, even
under the guidelines, that the harm inflicted on her
rose to the level of persecution.Although the guide-
lines would recognize that Safaie had a cognizable
claim, they stress the Third and Eighth Circuits'
opinions which accept that a women has views fun-
damental to her system only when she has risked
the severe consequences of noncompliance. In this
case, the record failed to establish that Safaie risked
suffering to this extent. The record also failed to
establish that she could not seek protection else-
where in Iran. The Eighth Circuit's opinion fails to
indicate whether certain regions of Iran could pro-
vide protection for women with feminist views.
The guidelines do not specifically limit asylum
to women who have suffered physical abuses, but
they specifically mention that the applicant in Fatin
avoided foreseeable physical abuses. The Eighth
Circuit's statement of facts reveals that Safaie was
threatened but does not mention any concrete acts
of sexual or physical violence. Neither Fatin nor the
guidelines preclude a court from finding persecu-
tion based on non-physical abuse. However, because
67 Id. at 5; see also Deborah E. Anker, Women Refu-
gees: Forgotten No Longer? 32 San Diego L. Rev. 771,798-
99 (1995) (suggesting reform of interview process).
681d.
OId. at 5-6.
70 Id. at 6-7.
71 1d. at 7.
72Id. at 11.
the guidelines define fundamental beliefs in terms
of a choice to suffer physical harm, a successful claim
may very well lie in the proof of physical abuse.
An immigration attorney would have to fill these
gaps in the factual record before an applicant like
Safaie could prevail. Hence, under the new guide-
lines, the immigration attorney's most pressing jobs
are to present the details surrounding a gender-based
persecution claim and to -demonstrate clearly how
that particular factual record rises to a level of per-
secution. While the guidelines do not require an
applicant to suffer physical abuse, it appears that
the INS places great emphasis on physical abuse.
Hence, the immigration attorney should specifically
list and describe the physical abuses which an ap-
plicant has suffered.
Although the guidelines do not appear to
change the legal analysis with which adjudicators
will examine gender-based asylum claims, they en-
courage asylum officers to develop more complete
and descriptive factual records that demonstrate a
choice of noncompliance. Had the guidelines been
in place at the time of Safaie, the interviewer may
have been able to recreate the factual circumstances
that would have demonstrated such a choice. Only
with a complete and detailed record can a court
decide in favor of an asylum applicant with a gen-
der-based claim.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Allison Williams
